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in the global economy.  It examines the processes by which trading standards 
are transported via supply chain relationships, which ultimately become 
embedded in products and recognized by consumers at various stages.  In this 
analysis, the cases of Wal-Mart and IKEA provide insight into the ways by 
which national systems extend themselves globally, their contrasting effects on 
the business environments in host localities, and the impact of the resulting 
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1. Introduction 
 
Liberalization of trade and capital movements has contributed to increasing 
global inter-dependence and integration. Customers and investors are 
demanding that firms be ever more responsive to changes in technologies and 
market requirements and that they deliver consistently high quality products and 
services at low price.  At the same time, companies are being urged to prioritise 
shareholder interests, deliver continuous improvement in short term financial 
results and be transparent in their reporting.  However, despite these pressures 
for conformity, there is substantial evidence that national systems are evolving 
in such a way as to maintain the distinctive characteristics that differentiate 
‘varieties of capitalism,’ giving rise to a growing body of literature on this 
phenomenon. 
 
One strand of the research distinguishes the shareholder from more stakeholder 
oriented varieties, with much of the debate centring around questions of 
convergence towards (and divergence from) the dominant ‘Anglo-American’ 
shareholder based model (Hutton, 1995; Hansmann and Kraakman 2001; Dore 
2000).  Other studies differentiate systems on the basis of their institutional 
characteristicsi.  Hall and Soskice (2001), for example, distinguish ‘liberal 
market economies’ (LMEs) such as the US and UK from ‘coordinated market 
economies’ (CMEs) such as Germany and Japan; the former being characterised 
by hierarchies and competitive market relationships and the latter by networks, 
other forms of collabouration and ‘relational contracting.’ In a similar vein, 
Jacoby (2005) differentiates capitalist systems according to the role and relative 
importance assigned to the requirements of production and markets, locating 
systems along a continuum ranging from the more organisation- or institution-
oriented systems (such as Japan and Northern Europe) to the more market-
oriented systems (such as the US and UK).  An important observation in much 
of this research is that while most systems are moving towards the market pole 
of the continuum, they are evolving in such as way as to maintain key features 
of the national productive system, with its particular set of core competitive 
capabilities.   
 
National systems imprint themselves on the companies originating within the 
home market; and because consumers’ demands are shaped by national social, 
economic and cultural norms and standards, they have an important influence 
on the approaches companies take in relations with suppliers, employees and 
other stakeholders.  This is in large part because these relations become 
embedded in the final product or service and are likely to be recognized by 
consumers.  In Sweden, for example, the high societal value placed on social 
and economic justice and distributional equity translates into a low tolerance on 
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the part of consumers for goods and services that are produced by companies 
using exploitative labour practices or irresponsible social or environmental 
behaviour anywhere in their supply or distribution networks.  By contrast, 
American consumers have traditionally been much more tolerant of such 
practices.  With globalization, dominant firms appear to be transporting 
characteristics of their national productive systems to developing countries by 
means of their supply chain relationships as well as to other countries in which 
they operate. The buyer power of large American firms like Wal-Mart, for 
example, is used to squeeze suppliers in order to minimize cost and price; and 
this impacts adversely on the socio-economic conditions in localities in which 
they trade. By contrast, the Swedish retailer IKEA exports the high quality of 
customer/supplier and employee relationships (expected of Swedish companies) 
to its suppliers in the developing world; and this contributes positively both to 
their socio-economic advantage and to IKEA’s own competitive success. 
 
While the distinguishing features of alternative national political and economic 
systems have been identified and described, insufficient attention has been paid 
to the co-existence and endurance of these alternative and competing forms 
within an increasingly global system; and the process by which different 
national systems extend and reproduce themselves both at home and abroad has 
not been effectively explained.  This is in part because most studies are 
descriptive in nature and do not go below the surface to open up and examine 
more closely the ‘black box’ of production, the dynamics of productive system 
relationships within and among national systems and the interrelationships 
between production and market requirements and outcomes.  Using the cases of 
Wal-Mart and IKEA, this paper takes a productive systems approach to examine 
‘varieties of capitalism’ from the perspective of the ways by which production 
and market relations are structured and prioritised.  It considers the nature of 
these relations and their interaction within the domestic economy and the ways 
that firms and national systems interact with each other in the global economy.  
It examines the processes by which trading standards are transported via supply 
chain relationships, which ultimately become embedded in products and 
recognized by consumers at various stages, from the supply chain through to the 
end consumer.  In this analysis, the cases of Wal-Mart and IKEA provide 
insight into the ways by which national systems extend themselves globally, 
their contrasting effects on the business environments in host localities, and the 
impact of the resulting supply chain relations on organizational performance.   
 
The paper is organised as follows:  Section two lays out the productive systems 
framework which forms the basis for analysis and explains the interrelationship 
between the quality of productive system relationships and competitive 
outcomes.  Section three extends this framework to distinguish varieties of 
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capitalism on the basis of the respective roles assigned to production and market 
relationships and the ways they are structured and prioritized.  Section four 
provides a comparative case study analysis of Wal-Mart and IKEA.  Section 
five sums up the main arguments and draws conclusions from the preceding 
analysis and discussion. 
 
 
2. Productive System Relationships and Competitive Outcomes 
 
Productive systems theoryii provides a general analytical framework for 
understanding the dynamic non-equilibrium processes by which firms and 
national systems evolve, reproduce and extend themselves globally, backward 
through their supply chains and forward through their distribution networks.  It 
views the firm-level productive system as embedded in a particular industry-
level system, which itself forms part of a broader national and / or global 
productive system.  While the boundaries of the productive system are 
determined by the level of analysis, the system as a whole is a coherent, unified 
system in which relationships between productive systems become relations 
within when the boundaries are re-drawn.  Relationships between firms in an 
industry or national productive system, for example, become relationships 
within that broader system just as relationships between nation states are 
relationships within the global productive system.  The quality and consistency 
of these relationships at every level of analysis is a crucial determinant of 
competitiveness and of the relative performance of the productive system(s) 
involved. 
 
Regardless of the level of analysis, productive system relationships have both 
technical and social dimensions. The technical relations are the functional 
inter-linkages between the various agents and factors of production, both within 
and between stages in the production process and encompassing the exchange of 
technical and other relevant information. These relations are objective and 
impersonal associations, shaped by the nature of the product or service and the 
process by which it is produced. Their effectiveness is determined by the level 
of cooperation within the system and the degree to which individuals fully 
perform their respective productive functions.  The greater the level of 
cooperation and engagement, the more efficient the system will be.  The social 
relations are the subjective and personal relationships among the human agents 
in the system.  They form the social structure in which the technical relations 
are jointly carried out and thus play a central role in determining the 
effectiveness of these relations.  Because there are inevitable and legitimate 
differences in the interests and objectives of individuals and groups within the 
system, particularly with respect to distribution, the social relations are also 
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important in resolving these conflicts such that everyone involved remains 
willing to cooperate and to participate fully in their productive roles.  The social 
relations are therefore central in the system’s ability to accomplish its objectives 
and to achieve operational and dynamic efficiency.iii  
 
The hallmark of high quality productive system relations is that individuals and 
organisations working together provide open-ended commitments to cooperate.  
However, because the returns from cooperation are realised over an uncertain, 
long time period, this will depend to an important degree upon the level of 
mutual trust, or confidence that commitments made will be honoured and not 
abused. In systems where there is little institutional support for high quality 
productive system relations, the creation and enforcement of generally 
applicable behaviour and performance standards (both formal and informal) to 
which individuals and groups are expected to subscribe will be an important 
determinant of the ability of constituent productive systems to perform 
effectively.  
 
Mutuality and power asymmetries are central forces structuring both the internal 
social and political framework of productive systems and the environment in 
which they operate. This is particularly the case when the role, interaction and 
evolution of broader institutions representing collective interests of productive 
system stakeholder groups (i.e. employees, managers, shareholders, customers, 
suppliers and society) are considered. Trade unions, employers’ and trade 
associations, the state, international organisations and other agencies represent 
collective interests; but their form, actions and the outcome of negotiations 
reflect the power differences among their various constituent groups. Thus, 
trade unions and employers’ associations are based on shared objectives of their 
members, but their internal organisations reflect the balance of power between 
sectional interests.  
 
The activities of the state are also shaped by this co-incidence of mutual 
dependence and power differences. The provision of education, health, social 
welfare, law and order and the regulation of trade unions and business, can be 
seen as furthering the common interest by increasing production, and by curbing 
the destructive exercise of sectional interests. Alternatively, state activity can be 
regarded as serving the particular interest of capital or labour. The state may act 
on behalf of capital to curb worker organisation, provide services which 
individual capitalists are incapable of providing and make good the corrosive 
effect of capitalist rivalry on productive resources, including the workforce. For 
labour, the welfare state might shift the balance of power in favour of labour by 
lifting from it the burden of poverty, disease and ignorance. No doubt, all of 
these elements play some part in the formulation and administration of state 
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policy, and are manifest in the legal and regulatory framework and in the other 
ways by which the state intervenes in class and sectional divisions.  
 
At the international level, nation states conclude treaties and collabourate in 
international institutions designed to regulate trade, international payments and 
capital flows. Many of these institutions --for example the IMF, World Bank, 
World Trade Organisation and European Union -- originated in the need of 
nation states to cooperate, to protect themselves from both the unregulated 
international movements of goods and finance, and the potentially destructive 
impact of unilateral attempts to control such flows. In this respect, international 
agencies serve the mutual interests of their member nation states by encouraging 
trade and financial interaction. However the form these institutions take, and the 
way they operate, reflect the relative power of different nation states, trading 
blocks and economic regions as well as the leverage of interest groups on 
national governments. 
 
Competitive outcomes will be determined by the quality of productive system 
relationships and how these contribute to the achievement of organizational 
performance objectives.  In this, whilst high quality, cooperative relationships 
are central to productive efficiency, the measure of performance effectiveness 
may vary across systems; and this will have an impact on the role and relative 
priority assigned to production and market relationships.  In the Anglo-
American system, for example, successful performance is measured in terms of 
short term net profits, which in most cases is reduced to shareholder returns in 
the stock market.  As a result, markets are prioritized and production 
effectiveness is assessed in terms of the value of a company’s shares of stock.  
The Northern European and Japanese productive systems, by contrast, measure 
performance in terms of long term production effectiveness and a balance in 
stakeholder returns.  In these systems, the requirements of production are 
prioritized and markets are the arena in which productive effectiveness is 
realized. 
 
 
3.  National Productive Systems and Varieties of Capitalism 
 
Varieties of capitalism emerge from differences in the institutional framework, 
the organization of the social relations of production and the quality of relations 
in the national productive system.  These together have an influence on the 
respective roles and priority assigned to production and market requirements 
and the mechanisms by which conflicts of interest are resolved in different 
systems.   
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The recent academic literature distinguishes what might be identified as 
production- oriented capitalist systems from those which are more market-
oriented (Jacoby 2005).  Production-oriented systems, like those of Northern 
Europe and Japan, are grounded in the recognition of the central importance of 
cooperation in production for competitiveness in markets. Effectiveness in 
production is prioritized because it is considered the means by which market 
success is realized.  In these systems, the ability to organizationally reconcile 
the interests of the firm and its shareholders with those of its employees, 
suppliers and other stakeholders serves as the foundation for effective co-
operation and responsiveness to customer needs. This in turn underpins the 
effectiveness of the national productive system and forms the basis for its 
competitive success.  By contrast, market-oriented systems, like that of the US 
and UK, are grounded in the neo-liberal belief in the superiority of markets in 
delivering optimal economic welfare and distributional justice.  In these 
systems, cooperation and collective organization are seen to be inherently anti-
competitive and hence economically damaging.  This idealization of the market 
has been institutionalized in economic, legal and business ideology and practice; 
and it has served to centralize corporate decision-making in the hands of 
management, while at the same time requiring them to prioritise the interests of 
shareholders over those of all other stakeholders.  In this context, markets drive 
productive system relationships and there is weak institutional mediation for 
reconciling the interests of internal stakeholders, including employees and 
suppliers, with those of the corporation and its shareholders.   
 
In production-oriented systems, leading edge HRM practices are combined with 
close relations with suppliers and customers (Applebaum and Batt 1994; Best 
1990)iv. Work organisation is participatory and non-hierarchical and inter-firm 
links are close and co-operative rather than hands-off and antagonisticv The 
result has been a more effective mobilisation of the commitment, skills and 
knowledge of workers and trading partners, serving to raise efficiency, improve 
quality, and generate a faster rate of product, process and organisational 
innovation. The effect of this type of competition is to create a competitive 
environment in which top priority is given to the design of organisations such 
that they can fully exploit the co-operative nature of production.  In market 
oriented systems, recognition of the competitive advantages associated with 
production-oriented ‘high performance work systems’ has encouraged the 
incorporation of degrees of worker involvement and other HRM practices into 
existing managerial structures and forms of corporate governance (Deakin et al. 
2001). However, little has been done to change ‘the fundamental nature of the 
production system or threaten the basic organisation or power structure of the 
firms’ (Applebaum and Batt 1994, p22). As a result, although most studies find 
that these new workplace techniques generate substantive productivity and 
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quality gains, even the most promising examples have proven difficult to sustain 
over the medium to longer term (Applebaum and Batt, 1994; Baker, 1999; 
Black and Lynch, 1997; Doeringer, EvansKlock, and Terkla 1998, Huselid, 
1995; Ichniowski et. al., 1996; Ichniowski et. al., 1997; Kochan and Rubinstein 
2000; Konzelmann 2003;Osterman 1994; Pfeffer, 1996, 1998). 
 
At the heart of the problem is a fundamental contradiction between the logic of 
markets as an efficient mechanism for allocating resources and distributing 
income and the logic of the management of production as a process for 
effectively combining and exploiting productive forces.  As emphasized above, 
cooperation and a high quality of relationships are central to the performance 
effectiveness of productive systems and their ability to achieve market success.  
However, there is a clash between the conditions for promoting co-operation 
and the way that markets operate.  Markets, as with other institutions in 
productive systems, serve two separate and conflicting purposes. Firstly, they 
serve creativity by providing the opportunity for developing competitive 
strategies based on improved products, processes and organisational forms so that 
superior forms of work organisation can better meet consumer needs. In this way, 
markets provide the means by which the mutual interests of consumers, owners, 
managers and workers can be realised. But, markets also provide the opportunity 
for the exercise of relative power and the securing of advantage in distribution; 
and in this, the interests of consumers, capitalists and workers are sharply divided 
and unrestrained rivalry is potentially destructive of the co-operation in 
production upon which creativity depends.  
 
In market-oriented systems, the mutuality of interest inherent in production has 
found its expression in theories of production management whereas theories of 
markets encapsulate the conflict inherent in distribution. However, the 
relationships of power within which the theories have been formulated have led 
to a denial of any significant misuse of capitalist power in markets or 
production, and consequently any need for countervailing forces. Thus, rights of 
corporations to pursue their interests in markets and managerial prerogative in 
the management of production are couched in terms of their service to the 
public interest. Any hindrance to market forces or the exercise of managerial 
prerogative is thus deemed inherently anti-social, effectively ruling out the 
possible development of institutions and organisations by which the 
contradictions between mutual and separate interests can be resolved.  In 
European, Japanese and other productive systems, where the management of 
production has played a more central role in policy making, the polarisation 
between corporate interests and those of workers and small organisations is 
much less than in the Anglo/American system. Rather, institutions and 
organisations have emerged to mediate these interests and to protect the weaker 
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stakeholders. In this way, institutional power (Bachmann 1999; Lane and 
Bachmann 1996) has been deployed to curb individual power and this has given 
greater scope for the realisation of mutual interests and for the development of 
high road production and marketing strategies.  
 
The degree to which a national productive system is market or production 
(institution or organization) oriented has an important influence on how 
industries are structured and how dominant firms behave, in the domestic 
market and abroad as well as backward, in their supply chain relationships, and 
forward, in their global distribution system.  Through this process, varieties of 
capitalism reproduce and extend themselves globally; and because dominant 
firms compete in the home country and in the host markets of suppliers and 
consumers abroad, alternative systems come into conflict with one another in 
both constructive and destructive ways. 
 
In the following section, the cases of two of the most successful global retailers 
in the mass consumer market, Wal-Mart and IKEA, are examined.  These two 
companies originate in very different capitalist traditions, which have enforced 
themselves on the respective retailers and transferred themselves globally, 
backward through their supply-chain relations and forward to the final 
consumer through their relations with employees and other stakeholder groups.   
 
 
4. The Cases:  Wal-Mart and IKEA  
 
4.1 Organizational structure and behavior 
Sam Walton founded Wal-Mart in 1962 as a single store in semi-rural Arkansas. 
Today it is the world’s largest retailer and America’s largest private employer.  
In 2004, it reported sales revenues in excess of a quarter of a trillion dollars 
(205 billion euros) and employed more than a million and a half people 
worldwide. More than a hundred million shoppers a week pass through Wal-
Mart doors in the U.S. alone.  
 
Wal-Mart has nearly fifty three hundred stores around the world, two-thirds of 
them in the U.S.; but as Table 1 shows, its foreign outlets grew twice as fast as 
its domestic core during 2000-2005. Wal-Mart currently operates stores in the 
U.S. and in eight other countries, including the largest chains in both Canada 
and Mexico. It is a major competitor in the UK, Brazil and Puerto Rico but less 
so in Germany, Japan, China, South Korea and Argentina. (Wal-Mart Annual 
Report 2005:53) 
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Table 1. Number and location of Wal-Mart stores, 2002, 2005 
 
 
       % change    % change   % change 
Location     2000       2002  2005 2000-2002   2002-2005   2000-2005 
 
Global     4,093      4,485 5,289        10  18         29 
U.S.     3,055      3,289 3,702          8  13         21 
International    1,038      1,196 1,587        15  33         53 
   Mexico       478         570    679        19  19         42 
   United Kingdom      240         254    282          6  11       118 
   Canada       168         196    256        17  33         52 
   Brazil         18           22    149        22            677       828 
   Germany         95           95      91          0   -4          -4 
   Puerto Rico         15           17      54        13            317       360 
   China           8           19      43      238            226       538 
   South Korea           5           11      16      220            145       320 
   Argentina         11           11      11          0          0           0 
Sources: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Home Page Online, May 2000, May 2002; Annual Report, 
2005, p. 53. 
 
Wal-Mart operates four types of store, the Supercenter, the traditional discount 
store, the smaller neighbourhood store, and Sam’s Club membership stores. Of 
these, its top performer by far is the Supercenter, which ranges in size from one 
hundred to more than two hundred thousand square feet and offers 24-hour, 
seven-day shopping for thousands of food and merchandise items, in addition to 
special services such as car care, vision centres, banking, hair salons, travel 
reservations and even temp employment agencies. Supercenters may be Wal-
Mart’s chief money-makers but, as Table 2 reveals, they are far more prevalent 
in the U.S. than abroad, accounting for more than half of all domestic stores but 
just one-quarter of foreign outlets.vi More than anything Wal-Mart is a one-stop 
merchandise plus grocery retailer. (Slater 2003: 26-29, 96-99) 
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Table 2. Number and type of Wal-Mart stores by location, 2005 
     Type of store 
Location          Discount   Supercenters    SAM’s CLUBS     Neighbourhood 
    
U.S.   1,353  1,713         551            85 
International  1,175     285           91            36  
   Mexico     529       89           61  0        
   United Kingdom    263       19             0  0        
   Canada     256         0             6  0     
   Brazil     118       17           12  2            
   Germany         0       91             0  0            
   Puerto Rico         9         4             9            32           
   China         0       38             3  2            
   South Korea         0       16             0  0          
   Argentina         0       11                         0  0   
Totals   2,528  1,998                     642          121         
Sources: Annual Shareholders Report, Fiscal Year 2005, p. 53. 
 
 
Wal-Mart’s original and still most numerous type of retail outlet is its classic 
discount store, a medium-sized outlet carrying a wide variety of general 
merchandise at prices typically well below those of competing department and 
variety stores. In America the company is rapidly converting discount stores 
into Supercenters as the former become obsolete in the race among retail chains 
to build bigger, more diversified stores. By contrast, discount stores dominate 
Wal-Mart’s four largest overseas operations. Sam’s Clubs off paid members 
restricted selections of highly discounted items in bulk quantities. They were 
originally designed for small business owners but increasingly cater to 
household shoppers. Except in Mexico, Sam’s Clubs are relatively infrequent 
abroad. Finally, neighbourhood stores, Wal-Mart’s version of the urban 
convenience shop, have so far been neglected, doubtless due to limited urban 
space and high rents and Wal-Mart’s customary reluctance to compete in big-
city environments.  
 
Wal-Mart thrives on low living standards. From Sam Walton to current CEO 
Lee Scott, the company’s sales revenues have relied primarily on low-income 
shoppers, for whom low prices are the determining factor when deciding where 
to shop and what to shop for. The company’s operating success at home and 
abroad has, as its signature slogan suggests, hinged on its ability to offer 
bargain-conscious customers ‘everyday low prices.’ This being the case, 
constant cost cutting is obligatory and Wal-Mart consequently has ‘an almost 
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single-minded focus on reducing costs. It’s imbued throughout the 
organization.’ (Hays 2003: BU-7)   
 
Cost cutting involves many things, including making good use of economies of 
large-scale operations and deftly applying modern information technology, both 
of which Wal-Mart does, and as a result has long been the undisputed industry 
leader in this regard. But that alone is not enough. Other large retailers do the 
same of course. Tesco, for example, has apparently overtaken Asda, Wal-Mart’s 
UK subsidiary, in the increasingly valuable area of gathering and utilizing data 
on customer shopping patterns.  Wal-Mart has however managed to maintain its 
competitive cost advantage in the U.S., mainly by forcing or persuading private 
and public stakeholders to pay part of its cost of doing business: workers 
through low wages and benefits, suppliers through rock bottom wholesale 
prices, communities through direct and indirect operating subsidies and the 
nation’s productive system as a whole through forced offshore manufacturing.  
 
Wal-Mart locates overseas stores where its business philosophy and practices 
are most likely to succeed.  In practice this means going into countries that 
either are steeped in free market ideology or offer low-wage labour, low income 
shoppers, ineffective unions and few social protections.  It stays out of France, 
for example, because it does not want to go up against Carrefour on the latter’s 
home turf and also because it would not find the right kinds of shoppers and 
workers there. Nor does Wal-Mart venture into any of the Scandinavian states 
with their strict business regulation and prosperous populations.  
 
The ineffectiveness of Wal-Mart’s ‘low prices at any cost’ approach to retailing 
in certain high-income, regulated economies is demonstrated by experiences in 
Germany, where its nearly one hundred hypermarkets have never made a profit. 
This despite its strategy of slashing store prices and then challenging existing 
retail chains to match the cuts. No sooner had Wal-Mart entered the German 
market than it announced with great fanfare reductions on no fewer than a 
thousand items. When this failed to have the desired effect, Wal-Mart reduced a 
thousand more, partly on the strength of the reduced wholesale prices it had 
wrested from European suppliers, emphasizing that the latest cuts would be 
permanent. The message to German consumers was that they were benefiting 
from American-style discount retailing. A German retail union official put a 
different cast on the matter. ‘The big retail companies pressure the producers for 
low prices,’ he said. ‘The suppliers then try to get the difference back from the 
small retail companies,’ jeopardizing the latter and, along with them, the 
superior quality and service offered by the familiar neighbourhood specialty 
stores. (Konzelmann 1999: 10) 
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German regulation has worked both for and against Wal-Mart. The federal 
government acceded to pressure from volume retailers and urban residents and 
allowed stores to stay open longer on evenings and weekends. (Konzelmann 
1999: 14) But no sooner had it done this than it dealt a serious blow to Wal-
Mart. The German Cartel Office, which is empowered to prevent large retailers 
like Wal-Mart from using below-cost pricing to drive out small competitors, 
ordered Wal-Mart, Aldi and Lidl  to stop selling six staple products -- including 
milk, butter and flour -- at less than wholesale cost as part of their Wal-Mart-
instigated price wars. ‘The material cost to consumers is marginal and 
temporary,’ said the cartel officer, ‘but the restriction of competition by placing 
unfair obstacles before medium-sized retailers is clear and lasting.’ He 
proceeded to threaten Wal-Mart and the others with heavy fines if they did not 
cease and desist. ‘To me it’s more about seeing that independent companies are 
not pushed out through the unjust pricing strategy of big companies with 
superior market strength,’ he explained. The German Retail Association hailed 
the decision as a ‘hopeful signal for the end of the ruinous cutthroat 
competition’ that was disrupting the industry. (Andrews 2000; Associated Press, 
2000) 
 
IKEA also began as a single store, in Almhult Sweden in 1958, and for its part 
has grown to become the world’s largest retailer of home furnishings. The name 
IKEA is an acronym for the initials of its founder, Ingvar Kampard, the farm he 
was raised on, Elmtaryd, and his village, Agunnaryd, in South Sweden. Ingvar 
Kampard’s initial store stocked a wide range of goods, from food to magazines.  
But during the late 1940s, he noticed that the cost of furniture had risen at a 
much higher rate than the prices of other household items, despite no apparent 
shortage of labour or raw materials, largely due to a tightly controlled industry 
by manufacturers and retailers.  These high prices were preventing a majority of 
the population from purchasing quality furniture.  In this, Kampard recognized a 
business opportunity that would also benefit a large segment of society.  So he 
modeled IKEA on the concept of offering a wide range of well-designed, 
functional home furnishing products at prices that most households could 
afford.   
 
This ‘concept’ lies at the heart of everything IKEA does, from the way it 
develops and purchases products to the way it sells and distributes them in 
IKEA stores around the world. According to his colleagues, Kampard is not 
driven by profits alone but also by a desire to improve the quality of life for 
people. According to Kampard, his goal is ‘to create a better everyday life for 
the majority of people. … We know that in the future we may make a valuable 
contribution to the democratization process at home and abroad.’   
 
 13 
To ensure that IKEA would continue to grow and maintain its traditional 
philosophy and concept well beyond his active involvement with the company, 
Kampard, decided to protect IKEA by registering it as a foundation.  As a result, 
IKEA is owned by the Stichting INGKA Foundation (registered in the 
Netherlands) and is therefore not vulnerable to disruptive pressures from 
potentially self-interested private family members or shareholders.  It is not a 
public company and does not publish profit figures; however, IKEA does 
publish information on such things as sales revenues, number of stores and 
number of employees.  The IKEA concept and trade-name are owned by Inter 
IKEA Systems BV, which in addition to a variety of other related businesses, is 
owned by the Kampard family. 
 
In 2004, IKEA reported sales revenues of 13.6 billion Euros ($16.8 billion) up 
from 4.4 billion in 1994 (IKEA Annual report 2005). As of June 2005, it had 
216 IKEA stores in 33 countries, of which 192 stores belong to the Foundation 
and the remaining 23 stores are owned and run by franchisees, licensed by Inter 
IKEA Systems, to which they pay royalties and fees.  IKEA employs around 
84,000 people and has business operations in 44 countries. In 2004, nearly a 
half billion customers visited IKEA stores, more than triple the number ten 
years earlier.  Unlike Wal-Mart, the IKEA concept appeals to customers in 
national settings across the range, from free market countries like the US to 
more regulated countries like those of Northern Europe and Scandinavia, 
appealing to customers’ preferences for low price and good quality (as opposed 
to Wal-Mart’s provision of low price at any quality).  Germany is IKEA’s 
largest single market, accounting for 20 percent of total sales, followed by the 
UK (12 percent), the US (11 percent), France (9 percent) and Sweden (8 
percent).  
 
IKEA’s approach for successfully delivering good quality products at low prices 
for customers begins at the development stage, where before the product is 
designed, its price is set at a level that provides high value at an affordable 
price.  IKEA then looks for innovative ways of creating the product, at a cost 
below the established price. To do this effectively, IKEA works closely with its 
suppliers in long-term relationships that permit the company to carefully 
observe production practices and to provide technical assistance with regard to 
improving efficiency, reducing costs and delivering quality.  Distribution is 
another key area of system efficiency for IKEA, which plays an important role 
in the ability to deliver low price.  In this, IKEA has strategically established 27 
distribution centres in 16 countries to ensure that the route from supplier to 
customer is as direct, cost-effective and environmentally-friendly as possible.  
IKEA also economises by locating stores in less expensive sites within their 
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market area and expecting customers to pick-up merchandise from the 
warehouse, transport it to their homes and assemble it themselves. 
 
4.2. Relationships with suppliers   
Wal-Mart’s ruthless cost cutting begins with its suppliers. So rewarding has the 
practice been that it is now the norm among large discount chains across the 
industry. With a massive network of suppliers, ranging from the smallest to the 
largest vendors worldwide, Wal-Mart is legendary both for working closely 
with major suppliers to ensure reliable, marketable goods while also demanding 
low prices (often annual percentage reductions), made to order product design 
and quality and smooth, timely delivery. Vendor owners, managers and 
employees typically do what they must to get and keep the Wal-Mart contract, 
including discomforting if not destructive concessions affecting everyone. 
Because their careers, jobs and incomes depend on satisfying Wal-Mart, if 
pressed, they will accept low wholesale prices and onerous supply conditions. 
 
Walton’s operating premise in dealing with suppliers was that every wholesale 
price is negotiable at all times because supply prices are always open to 
competitive bidding rather than being the purview of any vendor.  Big or small, 
all vendors should be forced to compete for Wal-Mart contracts and to do so 
largely under the company’s unilateral, often inflexible terms. (Blumenthal, 
1991; Tosh, 1993). 
 
One such example is North Carolina based Cannon Mills, which for years had 
been unrivaled for high quality production of cotton towels, blankets and 
bedding. During the 1970s, however, when the industry was beginning to feel 
the adverse impact of cheap foreign imports, Cannon, a dominant domestic 
producer, was in trouble. It was at this point that Wal-Mart offered to make 
Cannon a major if not exclusive wholesale supplier in certain product lines if, 
like Wal-Mart’s other vendors, Cannon agreed to conform its production and 
pricing to Wal-Mart specifications. Moreover, Cannon would have to restrict or 
sever altogether its supply contracts with several other large buyers, including 
K-mart and the U.S. military. Cannon management feared that accepting Wal-
Mart’s offer would make the company too dependent on a single buyer so it 
declined rather than compromise internal autonomy and control. Sam Walton 
politely thanked them for their time and went to Springs Mills, Cannon’s major 
competitor, where he made an evidently similar offer that was accepted. 
(Greenland 2004) 
 
Cannon Mills nevertheless fell on hard times and not long after Wal-Mart’s 
offer ownership of the company changed hands. Under the name Fieldcrest 
Cannon, and later Pillowtex, management divested traditional product lines and 
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finally, in 2000, sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Springs Mills (now 
Springs Industries) thus became a $2.5 billion a year company and a dominant 
player in what was left of the American cotton textile industry. So when foreign 
competition intensified, and Springs Industries found itself unable to compete 
against low-wage foreign producers and continue to supply Wal-Mart and 
others with competitively priced goods, it was forced to shutter some of its 
largest Southern plants. (Bell 2005; Mecia and Bell 2004) 
 
Wal-Mart’s global supply chain is another source of cost-saving for the 
company, with devastating effects on the trade balances of third world counties 
whose export sectors are vulnerable to Wal-Mart’s supply chain relations.  In 
Mexico, for example, Wal-Mart Mexico’s growing reliance on the company’s 
global supply chain rather than Mexican suppliers increased its ratio of import 
to total vendor purchases from 20 percent in 1997 to more than 55 percent by 
2002; and Wal-Mart is now the leading contributor to Mexico’s perennial trade 
deficit. To compete with Wal-Mart’s low prices, its largest Mexican competitors 
recently formed a purchasing association in order to create their own centralized 
supply chains. But in doing so, they further depressed domestic supply prices, 
contributing to lower profit margins and the steady decline of traditional 
Mexican manufacturing and agricultural suppliers. (Durand 2005) 
 
Another example is the global coffee industry. Some years ago, Wal-Mart began 
selling Brazilian coffee in its U.S. stores, based on a supplier arrangement with 
a Brazilian exporter that had vertically integrated coffee growing, roasting, 
packaging, wholesale brokering and international transporting under common 
ownership and control. Such productive consolidation reduced supply costs to 
the point that Wal-Mart could undercut competitor prices by a third. It also 
disrupted traditional supply chains, the chief victim being the African state of 
Uganda, which at the time relied on coffee resources for 90 percent of its export 
earnings; it did not, however, have the organizational capability to replicate 
Brazil’s vertical system. Not only was Uganda eliminated as a Wal-Mart 
supplier but consequently also lost market share to low-wage Vietnam, which 
only recently had produced less coffee than Uganda but by now was producing 
more than of all of Africa. Maxwell and Folgers, the next largest U.S. retail 
coffee brands, still import from a number of countries, including Uganda, but as 
their market shares decline (total coffee sales are constant), they too will turn to 
supplier countries having integrated supply processes. Uganda will not be one 
of them. (Anholt 2005: 28-30) 
 
The irony here is that while Wal-Mart and other discount retailers enable 
vertical integration of manufacturing abroad they help destroy it at home. By 
linking their low prices and consequent sales revenues to continuous imports of 
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cheap foreign goods made under integrated production systems, they disrupt 
similarly vertical systems at home. This has been true for some time, as one 
retail expert had concluded years ago: ‘Wal-Mart is now large enough that it is 
driving midsize to large players out of business and speeding consolidation 
among others.’ (Kaufman, 2000: 24) The transformation has been predictably 
effective in retail staples such as textiles and clothing.  
 
Consider the experience of Fort Payne, Alabama, a small town with ample 
supplies of both cotton textiles and cheap labour and a long-standing reputation 
as the ‘Sock Capital of the World.’ At one time, Fort Payne manufactured every 
eighth pair of socks worn globally; and as recently as the 1990s, one in every 
three jobs in Fort Payne involved sock-making. But with the rise of the discount 
retailers and their ability to squeeze vendors, imports of socks skyrocketed and 
wholesale prices plummeted. Wal-Mart and other discount chains were 
profitably selling a package of five pairs of cushion socks for $3.76 while Fort 
Payne’s mills struggled in vain against the trend.  One of the biggest, Robin-
Lynn Mills, saw its sales of $24 million on output of 30 million pairs of socks in 
1999 plunge to $12 million on the same volume in 2004 as the ‘world sock 
capital’ title passed to Datang, China. 
 
In Datang, Three Star Socks, comparable in size and output to Robin-Lynn, 
competes with American and other mills around the world from a distinctly 
advantageous position. Among other things, it has access to as yet unlimited 
supplies of cheap labour, trades in an under-valued currency pegged to the 
overvalued U.S. dollar and manufactures in an industrial district ‘of more than 
10,000 households in 120 villages, 1,000 textile material processors, 400 yarn 
dealers, 300 sewing firms 100 pressing operations, 300 packagers and 100 
forwarders.’ These vendors serve thousands of producers ranging from one-
room family enterprises to substantial employers like Three Star. In addition, 
local government subsidizes workplace energy consumption, provides 
discounted land and buildings, and offers tax abatements for jobs created. The 
major disadvantage Three Star and the others in Datang operate under is 
antiquated machinery; it takes three times longer to turn out a pair of socks in 
Datang than it does in Fort Payne, but at a cost of 27 cents for Three Star 
compared with 41 cents for Robin-Lynn.  
 
As a result of these cost differentials, in 2001, China as a whole exported 12 
million pairs of socks to the U.S., up from 6 million the year before; and by 
2004, it exported 670 million pairs, more than double the 264 million pairs in 
2003. During this same period, wholesale prices for Chinese socks in America 
fell by more than half, which explains why Three Star was selling more socks to 
Wal-Mart, Robin-Lynn was selling fewer and Fort Payne mills were being 
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closed. ‘If they shut the rest of the mills down,’ a local sock outlet salesman 
grimaced, ‘Fort Payne is going to be a ghost town.’  But not only have the sock 
mills been affected; having been pushed to the brink of dissolution, the Fort 
Payne mills reluctantly acted to dissolve long-time supplier relationships. 
Rather than go on fighting a losing battle in which he knew he would have to 
lay off still more production workers and make additional payroll cuts beyond 
the 10 percent reduction everyone, including the company chairman, had 
already taken, Robin-Lynn’s plant manager arranged for a Pakistani producer to 
supply the yarn needed to run his mills. Even with the added transportation 
costs, it could do so 35 percent cheaper than his North Carolina suppliers. 
‘Nothing is sacred now,’ he said. ‘We’ll change vendors for anything. Yarn, 
supplies, light bulbs, it doesn’t matter. The old loyalty where your buddy sold 
you the light bulb, that’s gone.’ (Lee 2005; Reeves 2004) 
 
These adverse supply chain effects extend beyond the American south. When 
Wal-Mart gave Carl Krauss an ultimatum, he found he had no choice but to 
transfer the production of parts for his family-owned company’s fan 
manufacturing plant in Chicago to Shenzhen, China. Wal-Mart had demanded 
that he reduce costs and wholesale price on floor fans or lose the account. When 
automation of the Chicago production line (eliminating some two-thirds of the 
assembly work force there) and persuasion of local suppliers to lower their 
prices did not deliver the prices Wal-Mart had demanded, Krauss reluctantly 
built the Shenzhen parts production plant, where workers made 25 cents an hour 
compared to the $13 he was paying in Chicago. ‘My father was dead set against 
it,’ he said. ‘I have the same respect for American workers [as he], but I’m 
going to do what I have to do to survive.’ Krauss succeeded in keeping the 
supply contract and Wal-Mart succeeded in reducing the price of the fan by 
half. (Goldman and Cleeland 2003) 
 
Low price and cost also are important objectives for IKEA, but not at the 
expense of product quality or social and environmental responsibility.  In order 
to maximize efficiency and keep costs down, IKEA has created a global 
organization that provides infrastructure, service and support to its various 
business units and helps them to identify and implement the most cost-effective 
technology available. Its business solutions and services are used in IKEA 
stores, warehouses, trading offices, catalogue processing, product development 
and other units where support is needed. IKEA is not dissimilar to Wal-Mart 
and other global retailers in the use of economies of scale in production and 
distribution. However IKEA invests in innovative production methods and 
smart design to keep costs low without sacrificing product quality. What makes 
IKEA unique is its ability to manufacture good quality products at low prices 
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while at the same time adhering to strict standards for social and environmental 
responsibility.  
 
Most of IKEA’s production takes place in lower-cost countries, with 20 percent 
being manufactured in China and 12 percent in Poland. Eight percent of IKEA’s 
products are manufactured in Sweden, with Germany and Italy accounting for a 
further 13 percent and the remaining 47 percent of production distributed 
around the world. (AFX Europe, July 2005) 
 
IKEA believes that protecting the environment and improving and maintaining 
good conditions at the level of the factory will reap long-term benefits for all of 
IKEA’s stakeholders. In 1998, it established ‘IWAY,’ to ensure that high social 
and environmental standards would be maintained throughout the company as 
well as within those entities with which IKEA has business relations.vii  ‘The 
IKEA Way on Purchasing Home Furnishing Products’ (IWAY) spells out 
IKEA’s expectations of its suppliers with regard to legal, employment, social 
and environmental responsibility; it also explains what suppliers can expect 
from IKEA.  In its 2004 IWAY, Social and Environmental Report, these 
expectations are clearly outlined.  Prior to commencing a business relationship 
with IKEA, for example, potential suppliers are required to refrain from using 
forced or bonded labour, child labour; and wood from intact natural forests or 
high conservation value forests.  In addition, IKEA requires suppliers to submit 
an action plan detailing how they intend to meet the remaining IWAY criteria.  
Suppliers are told that they can expect IKEA to be reliable; to adapt its products 
to suppliers’ production methods and contribute to efficient production; to care 
for the environment and support material and energy-saving techniques; to 
assume a clear standpoint on working conditions; to respect cultural differences; 
and to provide clear and mutually agreed commercial terms. 
 
Once a supply relationship has been established, IKEA requires compliance 
with national laws and regulations as well as with international conventions 
concerning protection of the environment, working conditions and child labour.  
It expects suppliers to respect fundamental human rights and to treat their 
workers fairly and with respect.  In this regard, suppliers are required to provide 
a healthy and safe working environment; to pay the legal minimum wage or the 
local industry standard and to compensate for overtime; if housing facilities are 
provided, suppliers are expected to ensure reasonable privacy, quietness and 
personal hygiene.  Suppliers are prohibited from using child labour, forced or 
bonded labour; from discriminating or using any form of mental of physical 
disciplinary action, including harassment; from using illegal overtime; and from 
preventing workers from associating freely with any worker’s association or 
group of their choosing or collective bargaining.   
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With respect to the environment, suppliers are expected to ‘work to reduce 
waste and emissions to air, ground and water; handle chemicals in an 
environmentally safe way; handle, store and dispose of hazardous waste in an 
environmentally safe manner; contribute to the recycling and reuse of materials 
and used products; and use wood from known areas and, if possible, from 
sources that are well managed and preferably independently certified as such.’  
They are not permitted to use or exceed the use of substances forbidden or 
restricted in the IKEA list of ‘Chemical Compounds and Substances;’ or to use 
wood originating from natural parks, nature reserves, intact natural forests or 
any areas with officially declared high conservation values, unless certified.’  
 
To monitor and ensure compliance with IWAY, in addition to its own auditors, 
IKEA contracts with independent auditors to inspect and monitor all suppliers 
with whom the company does business on an on-going basis; and those who fail 
to adhere are dropped as IKEA Suppliers.  Approximately 80 auditors in 
IKEA’s 43 trading service offices are responsible for supporting suppliers, 
explaining IKEA’s requirements, agreeing action plans for improvements and 
monitoring compliance.  In the event of non-compliance, auditors require, in 
writing, an action plan describing the corrective action, responsible person and 
timeline for completion; and this is sent to IKEA within one month of the audit.  
The auditors then follow up with suppliers to assure that the necessary 
corrective actions have been completed according to the approved action plan 
and timelines.  According to IKEA’s 2004 IWAY Social and Environmental 
Report, during fiscal year 2004, non-compliance with IWAY was a determining 
factor in the company’s decision to terminate business relations with 49 of its 
global suppliers; and as a result of this strict code of conduct, IKEA today 
works with 1500 suppliers compared with approximately 2700 six years ago. 
 
Because squeezing suppliers for better prices, without providing creative 
solutions to enable them to reduce costs and improve efficiency, will result in 
unacceptable working conditions that compromise quality and contribute to 
failures in living up to IKEA’s high social and environmental standards, IKEA 
works with suppliers to help them meet not only its price and quality 
expectations but also the requirements of IWAY.  An illustration of this 
cooperative and mutually beneficial process can be found in IKEA’s 
relationship with Shaw Wood in Nova Scotia, Canada, which in December 1998 
became the first North American plant dedicated to supplying IKEA.  From the 
start, IKEA treated Shaw Wood as a partner and provided extensive technical 
and creative support. Shaw Wood delegations visited furniture factories in 
Europe operated by IKEA’s Swedwood manufacturing division;viii and during 
start-up, IKEA provided the company with critical technical and engineering 
assistance, including the selection of production equipment based on 
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performance-based specifications capable of delivering the required levels of 
quality and productivity.    
 
According to Robert Shaw, president of the Shaw Group, IKEA has little 
tolerance for suppliers that do not push themselves to live up to its exacting 
standards. ‘Price of course is important,’ said Shaw, ‘but quality is one area 
where IKEA is relatively unforgiving. It also has environmental, working 
conditions and quality system policies that must be met. IKEA's quality people 
are in our factory constantly, as they are everywhere (where its furniture is 
made).’ According to Dean Robertson, general manager of Shaw Wood. ‘IKEA 
is a good customer but tough and very demanding on quality.’ In 2004, IKEA 
auditors graded Shaw Wood at level three of its four-level quality program. To 
reach level four requires having ISO 9002 certification, a goal Shaw Wood is 
actively pursuing.  
 
IKEA also worked with Shaw Wood to ensure compliance with the company’s 
high standards for environmental and working conditions.  Shaw Wood is in 
compliance with IKEA's forestry practices program. ‘We have a long paper trail 
between all of our lumber mills and harvesters to show IKEA that our lumber 
did not come from any old-growth forests or national parks, and that it was 
harvested in the right way,’ Robertsons said.  In the area of social standards and 
employment conditions, IKEA’s approach is rigorous but far-sighted.  
According to Robertson, ‘they inspect all of their supplier plants around the 
world in these areas and apply the toughest laws set by any one nation as their 
standard. They do this to level the playing field among competing suppliers. It's 
a bit of a pain to meet all of these things but it sets us up to be more competitive 
and a better supplier down the road.’ (Christianson 2001: 63).  
 
Not only does IKEA’s partnering with suppliers benefit their long-term 
performance; it has also had a positive impact on local businesses and on 
conditions in suppliers’ factories and the communities in which they are located.  
One such example is IKEA’s relationship with Nicholas Borsos, who in 1999, 
with the help of a loan from IKEA, purchased a state owned run-down furniture 
factory in Nehoiu, Romania.  According to Borsos, he learned about business 
from IKEA and has worked hard to meet IKEA’s standards both in his factory 
and within its supply chain.  Prior to the investment, for example, the factory 
had no ventilation system or air filters and working conditions were so poor that 
workers were forced to leave the windows open in the middle of winter.  The 
toughest thing about IWAY, according to Boros, is that he is also responsible 
for making sure his suppliers follow IKEA’s code of conduct, such as checking 
whether they are paying fair wages on time. But despite these strict demands, 
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Boros believes that IKEA’s standards have led to better conditions for local 
employees, the environment, and business; and sales have increased fivefold. 
 
4.3. Employment standards  
The labour extraction process presents another opportunity for Wal-Mart to cut 
operating costs. The company has developed exploitive labour recruiting and 
supervising strategies that enable it to obtain a steady supply of low-wage 
workers who have few employment alternatives and are therefore willing to 
accept the terms and conditions offered. Managers reportedly agree to work 
long hours for modest base salaries in the expectation of receiving large 
performance bonuses and then retiring before the associated stresses take their 
toll. Hourly workers agree to work for low wages, poor benefits and exacting 
supervisory demands out of diverse combinations of fear of losing their job, 
personal pride in a job well done and misplaced loyalty to a company that 
promotes a few from the ranks but otherwise seldom reciprocates. (Cleeland et. 
al. 2003; Tower 2002) 
 
But wage differentials are not its most important competitive advantage in view 
of the fact that Wal-Mart pays wages generally equal to or slightly below those 
of its competitors. The real difference arises from its practice of requiring store 
managers, under threat of disciplinary sanctions, to cut to the bone the number 
of hours of paid labour over a specified time period. The direct result of this 
policy is Wal-Mart’s lengthy record of labour offenses. More than two dozen 
class action lawsuits allege a company-wide practice of forcing employees to 
work without pay, or ‘off the clock,’ by means of a variety of overt and covert 
supervisory actions.  In some of these cases Wal-Mart has been found liable and 
in others has settled out of court.  
 
Independent investigation indicates the practice is so widespread among Wal-
Mart stores that it represents a headquarters cost-cutting strategy, albeit 
situational and circumspect in nature rather than direct and indiscreet. After 
months of interviewing former Wal-Mart associates and managers in 18 states 
and reviewing stacks of court documents and testimony, Steven Greenhouse, a 
New York Times labour writer, concluded that although Wal-Mart officially 
forbids off the clock work and short changing workers of overtime pay, the 
company’s ‘intense focus on cost cutting had created an unofficial policy that 
encouraged managers to request or require off-the-clock work and avoid paying 
overtime.’  
 
Verrete Richardson, a former apparel associate at a Wal-Mart superstore near 
Kansas City, tells a typical story in this regard. As she headed for the parking lot 
after her 10 p.m. to 8 a.m. shift, her manager ordered her back into the store to 
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return garments to the shelves and pick up discarded items. This was not the 
first time it had happened. At other times she had been told to bring in shopping 
carts from the parking lot after having clocked out. Still other times, before she 
had a chance to clock in a manager would direct her to a cashier and tell her to 
start checking out customers. Sometimes, she said, she worked as much as three 
hours before being she was able to clock in and start getting paid. She had 
always complied with these orders, she conceded, because she did not want to 
offend her supervisors. But she was nevertheless resentful that Wal-Mart would 
do that to her. ‘A company that makes billions of dollars doesn’t have to do 
that,’ she told Greenhouse.  (Greenhouse 2004a; 2004b; 2002) 
 
Finally, state governments have fined the company for multiple and repeated 
violation of child safety ordinances, wage and hour regulations, anti-
discrimination mandates and illegal immigrant laws. But the modestly penalized 
yet recidivist nature of these offences suggest that Wal-Mart, along with many 
other American employers, consider them a cost of doing business. (E.g., 
O’Brien 2002; Schafer and Helderman 2001) 
 
Unions could make a decisive difference but to date, not one Wal-Mart store in 
North America is organized.  Recognizing the obvious threat Wal-Mart poses to 
its existing contracts and negotiated standards, the United Food and Commercial 
Workers (UFCW) union and others have tried for more than twenty years to 
organize Wal-Mart; and although the UFCW has succeeded in getting about a 
dozen formal certification elections, some involving entire stores and others 
specific departments within stores, it has won only one, a small unit of meat 
cutters at a Texas store. However, after an unsuccessful appeal to nullify the 
election, Wal-Mart discontinued skilled meat cutting in that and other regional 
Wal-Mart’s, rendering moot the hard-won union certification. Several years 
later, the provincial labour board in Quebec, Canada, certified UFCW Canada 
as bargaining agent for hourly workers at a Wal-Mart store there; but again, 
after exhausting its appeals and going through the legal motions of negotiating a 
labour contract, Wal-Mart closed the store for ‘poor operating performance.’ 
(Barbaro 2005) 
 
A report on U.S. labour standards by the Geneva-based International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (2004) revealed that between 2000 and 
2003, Wal-Mart was involved in more than a hundred unfair labour practices, 
primarily involving union organizing attempts. Since 1995, the National Labour 
Relations Board (NLRB) has filed at least sixty complaints ranging from illegal 
firing of union sympathizers to unlawful surveillance, intimidation and threats. 
However, the most severe penalty Wal-Mart has received was ‘a requirement 
order to post notices in various stores that it will no longer threaten employees 
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who engage in ”concerted activity” deny their right to organize, require 
employees to report their contacts with unions, or discipline or fire workers who 
engage in concerted activity.’ 
 
On the labour front, Wal-Mart Germany experienced recurring worker actions 
including brief walkouts relating mainly to its repeated failure to observe 
prevailing pay and employment standards in German retail. As a result, Wal-
Mart Germany has had a difficult time recruiting and retaining qualified store 
and warehouse workers. A more striking demonstration of the difference 
between American and German expectations occurred when Wal-Mart’s home 
office in Arkansas tried to introduce a level of behavioral discipline in Germany 
that it routinely imposes on its domestic labour force. After having to close 
stores and finding it difficult to recruit and retain workers, Wal-Mart Germany 
inaugurated what it called an ‘employee ethics code.’ Along with their monthly 
paychecks, employees received a gratuitous lecture from the boss. The new, 
mandatory code prohibited employees from accepting gifts and from entering 
into romantic relationships with fellow employees in positions of employment 
influence; and it instructed workers to inform on other workers ‘if they observe 
that they have broken the rules.’ Non-compliance with the code, employees 
were warned, could lead to termination. When they issued the order, Wal-
Mart’s German managers informed employees that the code did not originate 
with them but came directly from their Arkansas superiors; and when the union 
vowed to resist in court, German managers declined to comment. (Deutsche 
Welle 2005). 
 
Worker rights expert, Manifred Confurius, rightly pointed out that American 
workers tolerate considerably greater restrictions on personal behaviour than do 
European workers and for that reason Wal-Mart’s unilateral code might not 
travel well Within weeks, a German tribunal, in response to union complaints, 
declared the rule changes illegal and the cross-national directive was not 
allowed to stand. (Morning News Beat 2005) 
 
Wal-Mart has also stumbled in the UK. With the success of several upstart 
discount food chains, UK shoppers had become used to regular price-cutting 
before Wal-Mart acquired Asda in 1999, then the fourth largest supermarket 
behind Tesco, Safeway and Sainsbury. For some time, Asda had been trying to 
increase market share using Wal-Mart’s cost- and price-cutting strategy, 
although not nearly as successfully. But under Wal-Mart’s control, Asda soon 
displaced Safeway and Sainsbury and moved into second place. Tesco initially 
faltered but under changed management distanced itself from the pack, 
including Asda, which began losing market share and by 2005 had fallen behind 
the previously vanquished Sainsbury, also under new management. 
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Asda’s decline was attributed to its failure to match Tesco’s quick perception of 
and response to a signifying change in consumer preferences -- from low prices 
to low prices plus service. Whereas Wal-Mart’s approach had come to dominate 
mainstream retailing in the UK, shoppers had come to expect price cuts as the 
industry norm and now wanted wide aisles, appealing shelf selections and 
informed shop assistants as well. The difference between Asda and Tesco in this 
regard is that Wal-Mart is less inclined than Tesco to sacrifice its cost-price-
cutting priorities in order to win over enough customers to maintain its earlier 
momentum. Its future in the UK is not in jeopardy as a result but is certainly 
less assured. (Rigby 2004) 
 
Asda has also experienced strained labour relations under Wal-Mart ownership. 
In late July 2005, GMB union members at Asda distribution centres supplying 
its northern UK stores, its area of greatest density, voted overwhelmingly for a 
series of brief strikes at the Washington, Tyne and Wear and Ince, Wigan 
depots. Asda Washington initially offered workers a generous 10 percent pay 
raise provided they agreed to give up collective bargaining rights; but when 
workers rejected the stipulation, Asda offered a 7.75 percent increase over two 
years, half of what the union was demanding, and informed 315 of the depot’s 
600 workers that they might be made redundant. At the Ince Wigan depot, the 
company announced plans to impose unilaterally a one-fourth increase in the 
number of warehouse items lifted during the regular 8-hour shift, on the grounds 
that this is the number of items Tesco employees lift. When workers protested 
the speed-up, management suspended a GMB shop steward pending 
investigation. Yet another dispute arose when Asda announced plans to cut 
some 14,000 jobs companywide – three or four managers from each store and 
numerous headquarters staff -- in response to market losses to Tesco and 
Sainsbury. GMB claimed that Asda junior managers had been joining the union 
in large numbers recently and that it would resist the reductions on their behalf.  
The union’s rationale for resisting each of these related incursions and for trying 
to publicize the industry trend producing them relates to the negative impact of 
Wal-Mart’s practice of reducing labour standards to a local minimum, which 
ultimately undermines labour standards for all workers in that market. 
(Donaldson 2005; Goldsmith 2005; GMB 2005) 
 
IKEA, by contrast, does not get the most out of employees by capitalizing on 
their labour market disadvantages but instead by developing their skills and 
commitment to the organization, and consequently, encouraging them to fully 
participate in their productive role within it.  According to an IKEA executive, 
successful employees ‘are people who accept our values and are willing to act 
on our ideas. They tend to be straightforward rather than flashy, and not too 
status-conscious. They must be hardworking and comfortable dealing with 
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everyone from the customer to the owner to the cashier. But perhaps the most 
important quality for an IKEA is ‘odmjukhet,’ a Swedish word that implies 
humility, modesty and respect for one’s fellow man. It may be hard to translate, 
but we know it when we see it. It’s reflected in things like personal simplicity 
and self-criticism.’ (Barlett and Nanda 1996: 5)  IKEA believes that the 
company’s employee culture plays a central role in supporting its philosophy 
and ensuring success. The company therefore makes serious efforts to propagate 
this culture throughout the organization by means of training and mentoring 
programs. It also attempts to export this culture to IKEA suppliers and the 
various entities with which they do business.  
 
However, difficulties and challenges arise with respect to differences in national 
social, economic and political norms and standards.  For example, when IKEA 
stores in the US are compared with stores in Scandinavia, differences in 
employee attitudes quickly become apparent.  ‘Because of low job security, 
American employees are always looking for guidance despite their higher 
education and need to achieve. The IKEA way requires openness and a 
willingness to take responsibility. We want people to stand up and disagree with 
authority if they have confidence in their beliefs. Despite intensive training 
programs it has been hard making the IKEA way their way of life here in the 
United States.’ (Barlett and Nanda 1996: 10)  Since most large retail stores in 
the US suffer from high rates of employee turnover, it is common for employers 
like IKEA to encounter employees who have worked at other retail facilities 
like Wal-Mart, from which they bring remnants of the culture of that employer, 
such as insecurity and low self esteem.  These negative attitudes are challenging 
obstacles to the employee culture IKEA is seeking to develop in its retail outlets 
in the US. 
 
To support its high commitment employment strategy, IKEA pays good wages, 
gives full benefits and provides health care benefits to anyone working 20 hours 
a week. New parents at IKEA can tap into its parental-leave benefits by which 
mothers automatically receive seven weeks off with full pay, while fathers and 
adoptive parents get one paid week. (Working Mothers Magazine 2005)  Such 
forward-thinking policies make employees feel that their contributions are 
valued, no matter how many hours they work; and this corporate vision, IKEA 
executives contend, has had a direct effect on employee retention. 
 
4.4. Social responsibility 
The triumph of the global discount retailers as stand-alone stores or shopping 
mall anchors indeed gives shoppers bargain prices, ample parking spaces, 
controlled indoor climates and, in addition, offers the promise of hundreds of 
hourly jobs and enhanced local tax revenues. However, some have argued that 
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discount chains like Wal-Mart make calculated use of communities in the drive 
for constant growth in order to achieve economies of scale from large 
distribution centres and saturation of store locations. In the process, they are 
accused of discarding community interests with the consequent traffic jams, 
empty storefronts, increased welfare costs and eventually closed or abandoned 
discount store buildings of the wrong size or location. Moreover, existing class 
and race tensions stemming from industrial decline of one sort or another is 
often intensified, according to critics.  
 
As the promise of low-price Wal-Mart retail outlets is widely tarnished by low 
wages, small business bankruptcies and costly local tax subsidies and 
abatements, communities and community groups have become divided in their 
willingness to host such stores. White-collar suburbs increasingly resist them 
while blue-collar, deindustrialized communities welcome them. In the ensuing 
disputes, the outcomes depend upon the relative political power of the 
contending parties. On one side are the discount chains, low-income shoppers, 
tax-starved local governments and low-wage or unemployed workers while on 
the other are the small local retailers, labour unions, environmentalists and 
community activists including women’s, minority and religious groups.  In 
Chicago, for example, Wal-Mart recently announced plans to build one regular 
discount store in a low-income, largely black and Hispanic ward on the West 
Side and another in a more middle-class and higher income black ward on the 
South Side. Besieged by both camps, Chicago Aldermen approved the poorer 
West Side ward’s bid and rejected the other. The West side had waged an 
aggressive campaign, calling attention to the 80 percent youth unemployment 
level in the ward. ‘We need those jobs. Something beats nothing,’ an alderman 
argued, ‘and we look for low prices.’ An anti-Wal-Mart alderman, however, 
painted a broader picture. ‘Wal-Mart does not just affect these two wards. It 
affects the whole of Chicago. There will be a race to the bottom in wages, 
benefits, full-time versus part-time employment,’ he warned. (Associated Press 
2004; Mihalopoulos 2004; Grant and Daniel 2004) 
 
Early concern over the rise of discount retailing focused on its destructive 
impact on existing stores and shops. (Stone 1997; Artz and McConnan 2001; 
Hicks and Wilburn 2001)  Of greater concern recently is the cost to 
communities in terms of municipal finances, mainly tax revenues and 
expenditures in the form of direct and indirect subsidies. A report released in 
2004 by California Democrat U.S. Congressman George Miller estimated that 
each Wal-Mart employee costs taxpayers $2,103 per year in public assistance 
expenditures for health care, food stamps, housing and energy subsidies and 
other benefits to low-wage households. Another study, by Los Angeles County, 
estimated the cost of Wal-Mart’s entry into southern California, taking into 
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account employment decline and the resulting downward pressure on wages and 
benefits, to be $2.8 billion per year in that region alone.  Yet another survey 
concluded that Wal-Mart has received at least a billion dollars in state and local 
government subsidies in connection with store and warehouse location and 
construction. (Good Jobs First 2005) 
 
Unlike Wal-Mart, IKEA has an established tradition and proven track record of 
good corporate social responsibility and of enforcing high standards throughout 
its productive system; and it goes far beyond most companies in its efforts to 
live up to and propagate high social, ethical and environmental standards 
globally.  One key area is that of the rights and conditions faced by children.  
IKEA has little tolerance for suppliers who use child labour; and it has worked 
hard to make a difference in this area in its relationships with global suppliers.  
A key motivator for IKEA’s pro-active approach in this area occurred during 
the 1990s.  In 1995, a 12 year old Pakistani boy named Iqbal Masih was shot 
dead in his home town of Murikde, Punjab; but his killers were never brought to 
justice. When Iqbal was 4 years old, his father had sold him into bondage to a 
carpet factory owner in Punjab because he needed a loan to pay for his older 
son's wedding. To repay the loan, Iqbal worked more than 12 hours each day in 
the carpet factory; but the loan could never be re-payed because the interest 
rates were so exorbirant. Although bonded labour was abolished in 1992 in 
Pakistan, the practice remains common. Iqbal was eventually rescued by the 
Bonded Labour Liberation Front of Pakistan; and trips were arranged for him to 
visit Europe and the United States to tell his story. Iqbal became a powerful 
symbol and a crusader against child slave labour.  In 1994, he was awarded the 
Reebok Human Rights Award and a television documentary on slave labour was 
produced and aired in which IKEA was implicated as one of the companies 
being supplied by Pakistani factories using bonded labour.  This was a huge 
wake-up call for IKEA; and its owners, management, and customers were 
deeply disturbed.  In response, IKEA committed itself to actively work to 
rectify the situation and ensure that it never again did business with suppliers 
using exploitative practices towards children.  
 
It also committed itself to create a code of conduct that extends to all aspects of 
social and environmental responsibility. The result was IWAY. IWAY is based 
on the eight core conventions defined in the Fundamental Principles of Rights at 
Work, ILO declaration June 1998, the Rio Declaration on Sustainable 
Development 1992, and the fundamental principles of human rights, as defined 
by the ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’. IKEA committed to applying 
these requirements to IKEA suppliers worldwide.  
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IKEA has endeavored to positively impact the conditions experienced by 
children more generally.  An important initiative is its children’s rights project 
with UNICEF, started in August 2000, in the Northern State of Pradesh, India, 
covering 500 villages with a population of more than one million.  The project’s 
aim was to prevent and eliminate child labour in the Indian ‘carpet belt,’ by 
addressing the root causes, such as debt, poverty, the lack of access to 
education, disability and ill health.  Prior to launching the project, IKEA 
conducted research on the main causes of the problem found that child labour 
and the corresponding low levels of education were not due to a shortage of 
schools. To the contrary, empty schools were everywhere, some bearing the 
names of international companies, but the children were being put to work 
because their parents were in debt. In this region, poor mothers were falling 
victims to loan sharks; and it was their inability to pay the exorbitant fees that 
forced them to supply their children as collateral to the money-lenders, who 
were often owners of the handlooms.  The project’s objective was therefore 
aimed at helping the mothers, of potential and actual child workers, to escape 
the vice-like grip of the loan sharks. With the help of the project, lower-caste 
women have been assisted in paying 20 and 50 rupees a month into self-help 
groups; and this has enabled them to collectively save enough to open bank 
accounts and borrow at market, rather than usurious, rates of interest and to pay 
off their debts to the money-lenders.  ‘Now that we are financially independent, 
we can take our children and put them in school,’ said one woman in the village 
of Suiyawan. (Luce 2004).  As a result of the project, around 75,000 children 
who otherwise would receive no schooling will be educated.  Additionally, 
IKEA is supporting a vaccination program in the region under the auspices of 
UNICEF and the World Health Organisation (WHO). During a five-year period 
140,000 infants and 150,000 mothers-to-be in 3,000 villages, will be inoculated 
against serious diseases which has also been identified as a factor forcing 
children into work.  
 
Another example of IKEA’s efforts to improve the conditions faced by children 
around the world was its July 2003 launch of a Teddy Bear called ‘BRUM’ in 
its stores world-wide. Two Euros from the sale of each bear is donated to 
support children in Angola and war-torn Uganda. In Angola, the IKEA 
contribution will be used to support outreach programs for the estimated 1.3 
million children who are not in school. In Northern Uganda, the new funds will 
support play-based programs for reaching at-risk adolescents about the threat of 
HIV/AIDS. Youth peer educators will be trained as part of the program, and 
will reach out to other young people in camps throughout the north, where 
young people are especially vulnerable to HIV infection. (Unicef Press centre, 
March 2004). 
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Despite initiatives like the above, progress in some areas in Asia is moving at a 
slow pace and critics believe that IKEA could increase the rate at which its 
standards are being achieved, especially in South East Asia.  However, IKEA 
contends that most of its suppliers are in compliance with a majority of the 90 
criteria in IWAY.  IKEA also contends that in most of these cases, the non-
compliance issues will take time to resolve because a fundamental change in 
society must take place before major improvements are realised. Most of these 
obstacles are due to deeply embedded cultural and political factors which are 
very difficult to change.  IKEA strongly believes that if other businesses were to 
require from their suppliers to adhere to similar codes of conduct, the impact 
will be phenomenal.  
 
4.5. Conclusion 
Despite being the world’s largest seller and employer, Wal-Mart’s continued 
success is by no means assured. Its single-minded pursuit of the bottom-line and 
corresponding disregard for the public interest have given rise to a seemingly 
endless barrage of unfavourable media reports concerning its documented and 
alleged labour law violations and a host of other policies and practices that 
inarguably qualify as ‘bad behavior.’ These together have prompted a concerted 
public relations counter-campaign on the part of community groups, unions, 
women’s rights groups, environmental activists and individuals. In April 2005, 
the UFCW union launched ‘Wake Up Wal-Mart,’ aimed at educating the public 
about Wal-Mart’s destructive practices and persuading customers to stop 
shopping there.  In a similar vein, ‘Wal-Mart Watch’ was launched by the 
Service Employees International Union, funded by a combination of 
foundations and individual donors.  However, in response, rather than attempt to 
change its behaviour, Wal-Mart launched a publicity campaign designed to 
refute any criticisms of the company and to discredit those making them.  As 
these publicity wars escalate, Wal-Mart’s image as a folksy, country store-
keeper is rapidly being replaced by one of an international predator. 
 
By contrast, IKEA considers social responsibility an integral part of the 
company’s culture and philosophy of conducting business that should not be 
compromised.  This commitment originates in and has served to extend 
dominant features of the Swedish variety of capitalism in IKEA’s relations with 
suppliers and customers world-wide.  It has also permitted IKEA to invest 
heavily in socially responsible measures globally, backward through its supply-
chain and forward to its customer base. As a result, IKEA has substantially 
improved working conditions in its supplier plants, which in turn have worked 
to improve conditions within their own supply chains.  These improvements 
have yielded higher productivity and better quality, contributing positively to 
both suppliers’ and IKEA’s bottom line.  The IKEA approach has also benefited 
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society and IKEA stakeholders more generally by bringing up conditions for 
suppliers and local host communities, employees throughout the IKEA system 
(from the point of supply through to the sale of final products), customers and 
communities in which IKEA retail outlets are located. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Since the end of World War Two, the industrial structure of the global retail 
sector has profoundly changed. Under the earlier system, a few dominant firms 
in each of the basic supplier industries produced and sold retail product lines to 
department stores, variety chains, independent specialty shops and 
supermarkets, more or less on terms set by the supplier; and retailers gladly 
offered consumers fashionable, brand-name products, manufactured by well-
known companies whose relative size and scope gave them the bargaining 
leverage to present the retailers with ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ wholesale prices.  But 
with the rise of the giant discount retailers like Wal-Mart and IKEA, the system 
shifted to one where suppliers were forced to play by the retailers’ rules. ‘As 
consumers were increasingly drawn by the stores’ low prices rather than the 
manufacturers’ brand names, these retailers built enough market share to start 
making demands of their suppliers: about prices, marketing and even product 
design and production methods.’ (Mitchell 2005)   
 
It is in this context that Wal-Mart and IKEA compete for customers of discount 
home furnishings, with a comparable degree of power and influence in their 
relations with suppliers.  However, the two companies exercise this power in 
very different ways, with vastly different outcomes both in terms of the impact 
of the corporate productive system on its social and economic environment 
(domestic and global) and in terms of the long-term performance of the 
company, those within its supply chain and the communities in which its 
suppliers and retail stores are located.  Whereas Wal-Mart uses its market power 
to squeeze suppliers in order to minimize cost and price, with adverse effects on 
the socio-economic conditions in localities in which they trade, IKEA’s power 
is used in a constructive way, to work with suppliers in order to help them 
deliver low prices without compromising product quality or social and 
environmental standards.  In so doing, IKEA exports the high quality of 
customer/supplier and employee relationships expected of Swedish companies 
to its third world suppliers and its retail outlet employees and customers, to the 
mutual benefit of these stakeholder groups, host localities and IKEA itself.  The 
cases of Wal-Mart and IKEA thus demonstrate the process by which national 
varieties of capitalism enforce themselves on companies originating within their 
borders, which in turn, transport dominant features of the national variety of 
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capitalism globally, backward through the supply chain and forward to 
employees and customers at home and abroad. 
 
In discount retailing, the customer is in the dominant position; and consumer 
preferences with respect to quality and price will importantly determine the 
approach retailers are incentivised to take in their supply chain relations, with 
consequent impacts throughout the system.  For example, a potentially vicious 
cycle is set off when consumer preferences for low price overwhelm other 
considerations.  In this case, retailers (like Wal-Mart) have strong incentives to 
minimize costs, putting downward pressure on wages (and household incomes) 
in the supply chain, the final goods sector and their own workforce.  This in turn 
depresses effective demand, putting further downward pressure on prices as the 
cycle degenerates.  As prices within the supply chain are squeezed further, 
domestic suppliers may find it impossible to compete with lower cost foreign 
suppliers, with adverse impacts (both direct and knock-on effects) within 
sections of the supply chain and in the local economies in which their operations 
are embedded.  At first, low prices for final sector goods and services may keep 
the system operational because of shifting patterns of expenditure towards lower 
price retailers as the wages and incomes of a growing number of households fall 
and they are increasingly unable to pay higher prices.  But eventually, this 
inability to pay will reach a point where it adversely impacts even the lowest 
price retailers as the income and employment situation of a larger and larger 
proportion of the labour force deteriorates and the demand base disappears. At 
some point, the household sector is not able to reproduce itself in either the 
home country or the foreign supply chain host country.  Although taken to its 
extreme, this scenario typifies the case of deep discount retailing in the United 
States, in which Wal-Mart plays a key role.  Because its aggressive and single-
minded cost cutting are demonstrably effective and therefore threatening to 
other firms, Wal-Mart’s approach has come to dominate national and 
multinational retailing, with potentially degenerative effects.   
 
By contrast, IKEA’s ability to cut costs without sacrificing quality or high social 
and environmental standards offers an alternative way forward and one that 
poses a significant threat to the long-term performance viability of companies 
like Wal-Mart, which depend on a consumer orientation for low price at any 
quality.  In the long-term, companies like IKEA are likely to have the advantage 
because when given the choice, customers will inevitably prefer better quality 
for given prices. 
 
Returning to the discussion above, what is required for the system to succeed 
and expand is a sufficient price to suppliers to enable provision of good terms 
and conditions of employment (both in the home and foreign suppliers’ 
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markets) and a sufficient price to labour to support effective demand and 
reproduction of the labour force.  In this virtuous cycle, there is a balance in the 
flows of resources and payments throughout the system; and from the 
perspective of the long-term effectiveness of the household, firm, national and 
global productive systems, this is essentially a ‘win-win’ situation for all 
involved.  The IKEA case provides a powerful illustration of this dynamic 
process.  Because IKEA is a major global player in the discount retail sector, 
offering goods and services in which these standards are embedded at 
competitive prices internationally, it is successful not only in the Swedish 
market but also in the others in which it has operations.  In this case, success 
breeds success, setting off a virtuous cycle with quite the opposite effects to a 
strategy like Wal-Mart’s. 
 
As the cases of Wal-Mart and IKEA demonstrate, markets will operate as 
destructively or constructively as they are permitted by the national productive 
system in which they are located; and companies originating and / or operating 
within them will behave accordingly.  Wal-Mart, for example, is a product of 
American neo-liberal ideology embodied in American capitalism, which 
idealises free and unrestricted markets; views large size and market dominance 
as the reward for successful competition; and considers managerial prerogative 
as the efficient way of coordinating relationships within large firms.  Because 
cooperation and collective organization are assumed to be inherently anti-
competitive and hence economically damaging, fierce opposition to unions is 
justified; and lax laws with respect to labour and corporate standards permit 
exploitation of weaker stakeholders at a relatively low cost to the company.  
The strong preferences of American consumers for low price, their high 
tolerance for exploitation and social and environmental irresponsibility and their 
increasing dependence on cheap goods and services as more and more 
households find themselves among the ‘working poor,’ lends support to the 
proliferation of deep discount retailers like Wal-Mart, contributing to their 
success in the U.S. market.   
 
Not surprisingly, Wal-Mart avoids locations where its business philosophy and 
practice is unwelcome, illegal and likely to be unsuccessful. The less regulated 
the national economy and the lower the standard of living among shoppers and 
workers, the better Wal-Mart fares. The company has had its greatest successes 
in English-speaking nations steeped in free market ideology and, alternatively, 
in low-wage developing countries with weak unions and social protections. 
Accordingly, Wal-Mart’s most recently targeted markets are in Eastern and 
Central Europe.  By contrast, Wal-Mart avoids economies like Sweden, which 
are characterized by high family incomes, narrow earnings differentials and 
comprehensive social programs.   
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IKEA is a product of the Swedish variety of capitalism, with its strong tradition, 
ideology and societal value for social democracy, distributional equity and 
corporate and personal social responsibility.  Access to the Swedish market 
requires a high standard of quality, social and environmental responsibility, 
which in turn underpins the country’s high social and labour standards.  
Evidence of the social imposition of high national standards of corporate 
behaviour and social responsibility on Swedish companies can be found in such 
things as IKEA’s immediate and pro-active response when the exploitation of 
child labour was discovered in its Pakistani supply chain.  IKEA’s constructive 
response demonstrates the embeddedness of these high standards in the 
company’s corporate culture and the ability to transfer them globally to the 
mutual benefit of all of the system’s stakeholder groups.  By contrast, in the 
case of Wal-Mart, recent pressure in reaction to the company’s widely 
publicized bad behaviour is generating a public relations counter-response 
rather than a reflective change in corporate behaviour.  In the case of Wal-Mart, 
the boundaries of minimal accepted standards are being tested in U.S., and 
driven even further downward, to the disadvantage of all but the short-term 
interests of the dominant stakeholders in the system. 
 
IKEA’s success and that of its suppliers and other stakeholders demonstrate the 
contribution to long-term performance effectiveness that high quality 
cooperative productive system relationships can make.  But the ability to 
maintain these relationships is based on a supportive institutional framework 
and the ability to secure a high level of mutual and reciprocal trust that 
commitments made will be honoured.  In the IKEA case, high quality 
productive system relationships are enforced at the corporate, national and 
societal levels.  IWAY, for example, contractually requires of suppliers a high 
standard of social, economic and environmental responsibility, good terms and 
conditions of work and recognition of independent representatives of weaker 
stakeholders, such as trade unions.  IKEA’s system of corporate governance in 
the form of the IKEA Foundation ensures that commitments made by the 
company to its various stakeholders (such as employees, suppliers and local 
communities) are not undermined by the requirements of a dominant 
stakeholder group.  The Swedish national system provides both institutional 
support for IKEA’s strategic approach from a social, legal and economic 
perspective and imposes high standards of corporate behaviour and 
responsibility on IKEA and, by extension, the companies with which it does 
business.  
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As evident in the cases, corporate concentration in retailing has directly affected 
the trade fortunes of third world countries, whose major export sectors are 
vulnerable to the supply chain relations of global buyers.  Wal-Mart’s approach 
demonstrates the process by which discount prices based on low living 
standards reverberate through the entire retail system to the detriment of 
domestic manufacturing; and given the global nature of production systems, the 
vicious circle moves from one national system to another.  By contrast, IKEA’s 
approach shows that it is possible to deliver low price and good quality while at 
the same time adhering to high standards of social, economic and environmental 
responsibility at home and abroad.  Whereas the Wal-Mart case illustrates the 
potential costs of a market based, 'low road’ approach to global sourcing, the 
IKEA case demonstrates the potential benefits of an organization-oriented, 
‘high road’ strategy to long-term system performance for the corporate, national 
and global productive system of which it forms a part.   
 
Notes 
 
i
  See, for example, Berger and Dore (1996); Hall and Soskice (2001); Hollingsworth 
and Boyer (1997); Quack, Morgan and Whitley (1999); Streeck and Yamamuro 
(2001); Whitley and Kristensen (1995, 1997, 2001). 
ii
  For a further elabouration, see Birecree, Konzelmann and Wilkinson (1997); 
Wilkinson (1983); and Wilkinson (2002). 
iii
  For development of these ideas see Birecree, Konzelmann and Wilkinson 
(1997). 
iv 
 Applebaum and Batt (1994) in their extremely valuable study identified 4 main 
systems of cooperative production: Japanese lean production; Italian flexible 
specialisation; German diversified quality production; and Swedish sociotechnical 
systems. The Japanese and Swedish systems are more firmly rooted in Taylorist mass 
production than the German or, particularly, the Italian. But what the four systems 
have in common is the importance given to high levels of worker training and the 
success they have achieved in closely involving workers at all levels in the 
organisation and management of production, in product and process innovation and in 
the development of organisations and institutions designed to facilitate cooperation 
working relationships. 
v 
 Inter-firm relations in the Anglo-American Britain have been typified as ‘adversarial 
dealings between short-horizon contractors, each party seeking out its immediate 
advantage’; market individualism which has traditionally driven English law of 
contract. (Brownsword 1997, p.255). 
vi
 Aggregate figures are misleading because in 2005 Supercenters, for example, were 
the exclusive format in four countries including Germany but were non-existent in 
Canada. 
vii
 IWAY was fully implemented by September 2000. 
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viii
 Since its formation in 1991, Swedwood has grown to operate 30 furniture and 
board plants and sawmills in 10 countries. 
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